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Justice, Play, and Politics
by Eugene Garver*
Justice as Play1 is a highly illuminating gloss on Coke's idea of the
law as "artificial reason," and one of its merits is that it is equally about
the law as artificial and as reason. While he leans on Huizinga to talk
about justice as play, Jack Sammons deepens the analogy by another
meaning of play, celebrating the venerable connections between the trial
and the drama as relatively insulated arenas for developing alternatives
to the existing political order. According to Jack, legal argument can be
regarded as play because of that relative insulation. So I want to turn
from judicial to deliberative and political reasoning and ask whether it
too can be regarded as play, in spite of its not having several of the
features that Jack singles out to make his analogy.' To be quite unfair
to Justice as Play, one could say that it argues that justice, and legal
argument, is play because political argument is not. I am interested in
what we can learn about political argument from thinking about legal
argument as play.
I also want to ask a question Jack does not ask: if legal argument is
a game, what sort of game is it? Justice, as embodied in trials and other
legal proceedings, is a very peculiar sort of game. One set of people plays
and another pays. The best analogy I can think of is cock-fighting. In
addition, one often has to participate, while in most games, playing is
optional. So I want to use Justice as Play as a place to look at the nature
of representation.3
Justice is play because it has a certain freedom from politics, a
freedom that, as Jack notes, is a privilege granted by the political

* Regents Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, Saint John's University (Minnesota).
University of Chicago (A.B., 1965); University of Chicago (Ph. D., 1973).
1. Jack L. Sammons, Justice as Play, 61 MERCER L. REv. 517 (2010).
2. I use deliberative and political as synonymous adjectives for one kind of rhetoric, and
judicial and forensic for the other.
3. It is true, as Sammons has written elsewhere, that legal ethics calls for certain
participation by clients, but not in presenting legal argument. There the client speaks only
through the attorney. See, e.g., JACK L. SAMMONS, LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1988).
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community.4 A cynic might argue that relative autonomy opens up a

space for a non-threatening venting of ideas that would be dangerous if
taken seriously.5 This is play as the contrary of the serious, so one
challenge for someone treating justice as play is to show how its ludic
aspects don't make it frivolous.
The analogy to tragic drama brings out one respect in which legal
argument is artificial reason. The participants who meet as adversaries
are actors. They separate their dramatic personae from the identities
they have outside the courtroom. They speak for other people. They
speak in a stylized, artificial language that is designed to make everyone
constantly aware of the artificiality and conventional nature of the
combat. Aristotle insists that the ethos that is the most authoritative
source of proof be an ethos constituted by argument, not antecedent
reputation. The evident artificiality of the courtroom promotes the
recognition of this artful ethos. Jack expresses the artificial and so selfcontained nature of legal argument beautifully:
The judge and jury are to do nothing that would render the "we"
whose definition is at issue static and known, nothing that would
render the "persons" appearing before the court anything less than the
singularities they are, and nothing that would jeopardize the open and
ongoing nature of the conversation. We give the most credence, as did
the Greeks, to those decisions that are made in public in conscientious
avoidance of these prior commitments.6
Put in more usual vernacular language, judges don't legislate from the
bench. Even when an equitable decision corrects the laws, it only
corrects them for that particular case. More generally, legal argument
and the judicial decision are temporary islands of definiteness in a sea
of prior and posterior indeterminacy. The good legal argument and
decision leave the world as indeterminate as they find it.

4. Sammons, supra note 1, at 530.
[Wle think we know-we need mention only the frequent censorship of theatre
throughout history in the name of security-that the theatre and the legal
conversation could be threats to the polity precisely because they have the alterity

they do. When the political claims that it is the polity, as the political almost
always does, this alternative polity of rhetoric, however it might be understood,
would seem unambiguously to need political control.

Id.
5. Please note that when I contrast Jack with Aristotle, this is not a criticism of Jack
for failing to say what Aristotle says. Jack is as little a typical contemporary American as
Aristotle was a typical Greek of his time, but their differences do tell us something about
the contemporary situation.
6. Sammons, supra note 1, at 547.
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The artificial character of rhetoric is clearer in judicial than in
deliberative argument. The audience knows that lawyers are advocates
for their clients. But the audience has to evaluate the arguments as
making a case for the justice of their client's cause, not the performance
of actors. To anticipate, representation here is transparent-we see
through the lawyer to the client. We have to ignore the fact that lawyers'
statements are interested by concentrating on the characters the actors
play, and refusing to acknowledge that they are players. This is, in
Coleridge's term, the suspension of disbelief.
In Rhetoric III Aristotle offers the common maxim that the best art
conceals the fact that it is art, and the best rhetorician looks natural.
Judicial rhetoric is an exception. Judicial rhetoric has to be a game that
makes its artificial nature clear through the formalities that insure that
we don't conflate the actor with his role, just because the audience has
to be made to care about the best result. They themselves have nothing
at stake and so might favor one party over another for all sorts of
extrinsic reasons. That is, in judicial rhetoric, unlike deliberative
rhetoric, they might make a judgment solely on the performance values
of the contenders, judging them, as we might say, aesthetically rather
than judicially. Jurors shouldn't award style points. The artifices of the
trial might invite them to do just that, but Aristotle sees it the other
way around. Formality generates solemnity that makes the jurors take
their job seriously. One hint of how people can be made to care about the
just result, rather than praise the best performance, comes in Rhetoric
II: people "do not praise the same things openly as they do secretly [ou
phaner6s kai aphan6s] but to a great extent praise the just and [the
noble] while privately they wish rather for what is to their advantage."7
The artificiality and formality of judicial rhetoric encourages people to
praise the just and the noble.
The analogy to play exposes the ambiguity here. The judge and jury
are supposed to decide on the evidence, but can't be counted on not to be
attentive to the pleasures of performance detached from any sense of
justice to the contending parties. In the same way, the American system
of judicial rhetoric engages professional adversaries supposedly in the
interests of equality, so that the decision does not depend on the skill of
the parties, which is irrelevant to the rights and wrongs of the case, but
the inequalities of advocates just replaces that of the clients.
In an excerpt I will return to, Jack says:
Clients with strong and strongly conflicting intentional goals-often
understood by themselves as principled differences-represent the

7. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIc 198 (George A. Kennedy trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1981).
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ancient risk of a return to violence. What the lawyer does, then, is
what the Greek rhetorician did: translate this potential for violence
into a literary game that is always a conversation about the community
itself. The lawyer does this, while keeping the clients together within
the community, by speaking to it for them. Just as before, what stands
between right and might, between justice and power, between
conversation and violence, is a game. This game is only sustainable,
however, because of the willingness of others, most especially the
political other, to attribute justice to the judgment of an audience of
judges and jurors-people intentionally removed from the ways in which
we most commonly make our decisions. s
Lawyers "translate this potential for violence into a literary game."9
Jack's picture strikes me as too rosy. Zealous advocates can turn a
disagreement into something much more polarized, something that turns
out to have more potential for violence than the original dispute. Rights
are heavier weapons than desires. Even when advocates and their clients
are fully committed to accept the verdict of a judge-and that is not
always the case-the game of justice can as easily raise the temperature
and the stakes of a dispute as cool it off. Lawyers represent clients by
amplifying their voices. To the extent that law does not involve violence,
it is because politics does.
Legal argument is artificial in another way. Justice is reduced to the
justiciable. Controversies are only justiciable if two parties can
participate. Harms, no matter how serious, lie where they fall unless you
can find someone else to blame. An act of God is not justiciable. If a
defendant is not competent to assist in his own defense, or if the
government cannot defend itself without revealing secrets, there may be
justice involved, but not legal justice. "Political questions" are not left to
judicial decisions.10 Therefore, "Lawyers as advocates have often
insisted that the justice that is their responsibility is a world apart from

8. Sammons, supra note 1, at 544.
9. Id. Contrast Schmitt: "The essence of liberalism is negotiation, a cautious half
measure, in the hope that the definitive dispute, the decisive bloody battle, can be
transformed into a parliamentary debate and permit the decision to be suspended forever
in an everlasting discussion." CARL ScHMImr, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON
THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 63 (George Schwab trans., 2005). And consider Kahn's

comment: "Liberalism's political sin is the belief that it can always be inclusive because
talk will lead to understanding, and understanding to agreement. Sometimes more talk
just leads to more disagreement." PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FouR NEW
CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 135 (2011).

10. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962). "Legal rhetoric, for example, considers only
those disputes that must be decided; it also insists, at least in the form that emerges from
the Greeks, that the actual disputants meaningfully participate in the presentation of the
narrative and in resolution of the dispute." Sammons, supra note 1, at 532 n.95.
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the actual and that this justice is approachable only indirectly, perhaps
metaphorically, through the procedures and argued alternatives of
adversarial rhetoric rather than directly through dogma."" I will
return to the idea of metaphor later. I will also question the idea that
the alternative to adversarial rhetoric is "dogma." There are more
alternatives available. First, we are told that the alternative to law is
violence; here it's dogma. In both cases, politics and legislation is a
further alternative. 2
There is another side to law as artificial reason that the analogy to
games could illuminate. The combat in the legal trial is limited, which
is why it is seen as an alternative to violence. When the case is over, the
lawyers take off their masks and return to their normal lives. Except in
the case of capital punishment, even the clients engage, through their
surrogates, in limited combat. They might lose all their money or
reputation, but they are able to go on to participate in further litigation. 3 They continue as members of the community. 4 In an age of
total war, legal controversy is always limited. For this I turn to
Jonathan Shay:
Democratic process embodies the apparent contradiction of safe
struggle.... Democratic process entails debate, persuasion, and
compromise. These all presuppose the trustworthiness of words. The

moral dimension of severe trauma, the betrayal of "what's right,"
obliterates the capacity for trust. The customary meanings of words are
exchanged for new ones; fair offers from opponents are scrutinized for
traps; every smile conceals a dagger.
Unhealed combat trauma-and I suspect unhealed severe trauma
from any source-destroys the unnoticed substructure of democracy, the

11. Sammons, supra note 1, at 522 n.34. Also, quoting Huizinga:
We modems cannot conceive justice apart from abstract righteousness, however
feeble our conception of it may be. For us, the lawsuit is primarily a dispute about
right and wrong; winning and losing take only a second place. Now it is precisely
this preoccupation with ethical values that we must abandon if we are to
understand archaic justice.
Id. at 520 (quoting JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY-ELEMENT IN
CULTURE 78 (Beason Press 1955)).

12. KAHN, supra note 9, at 19. "Politics does not put the security of law in place of the
violence of the state of nature; rather, it brings sacrifice in place of murder." Id.
13. The exclusion of felons from voting, and so from citizenship, is another exception,

an exception that is not a mark against the theory but instead shows that that exclusion
is at odds with the rule of law. The Constitution bars corruption of the blood.
14.

The ancient practice of ostracism is a fascinating exception.
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cognitive and social capacities that enable a group of people to freely
construct a cohesive narrative of their own future."
There is one way in which law differs from games. Law has enough
distance from justice as the subject of political, as opposed to legal,
dispute that parties can either identify legal justice with justice or
distinguish the two. Imagine how oppressive the world would be if
justice was simply the outcome of legal process and if the law was the
only language of justice. A Miami Heat fan cannot credibly maintain,
after the 2014 NBA Finals, that the Heat is really the better team. But
a losing party in a legal controversy can always maintain that. 6 Maine
claims that Greek law and rhetoric was not able to make that separation:
One of the rarest qualities of national character is the capacity for
applying and working out the law, as such, at the cost of constant
miscarriages of abstract justice, without at the same time losing the
hope or the wish that the law may be conformed to a higher ideal. The
Greek intellect, with all its nobility and elasticity, was quite unable to
confine itself within the strait waistcoat of legal formula; and, if we
may judge them by the popular courts of Athens of whose working we
possess accurate knowledge, the Greek tribunals exhibited the
strongest tendency to confound law and fact. The remains of the
Orators and the forensic commonplaces preserved by Aristotle in his
Treatise on Rhetoric, show that questions of pure law were constantly
argued on every consideration which could possibly influence the mind

15.

JONATHAN SHAY, ACHILLES IN VIETNAM: COMBAT TRAUMA AND THE UNDOING OF

CHARACTER 180-81 (1994) (second emphasis added). Shay's comment that "the customary
meanings of words are exchanged for new ones" is reminiscent of Thucydides's observation
that in the madness of war "words lose their meaning." See JAMES B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS
LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTRUCTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER,
AND COMMUNITY (1984); LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH

AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 117 (1986) ("[A] willingness to compromise and...
even to accept total defeat are essential components of the democratic personality.
Democracy, like literature,... requires a kind of suspension of disbelief. At the normsetting level, as well as at the enforcement level, a capacity to contain one's beliefs in the
interest of maintaining a continuing community is critical. The problem of deciding on the
nature of the commitment to one's belief is one of exquisite complexity.").
16.
By the end of the twentieth century, not only had we depersonalized the
sovereign, but the West had taken a decisive turn toward the rule of law as the
single source of political order. A modem constitution imagines no political
situation or action to which the law does not apply; it can imagine nothing that
cannot be evaluated as a matter of law.
KAHN, supra note 9, at 54. My examples of incompetent defendants and the government
mooting a case on the grounds of national security are exceptions to Kahn's claim.
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of the judges. No durable system of jurisprudence could be produced in
this way."
Let me turn to political argument. Judicial rhetoric has a determinate
subject-matter, justice, because of its subordination to political rhetoric.
Political rhetoric has nothing to be subordinate to, except the way of life
that defines a particular community.I8 Therefore Aristotle says that
deliberative rhetoric is nobler and more worthy of a statesman.1 9 The
subject of deliberation is the human good, and that is a subject too
important to be subjected to rules. The challenge is to make political
rhetoric limited in the sense that Shay uses, while not limited in subject.
It is a contained and limited struggle about the human good. The lack
of determinate subject-matter changes the relation between speaker and
audience. Because of the indefinite subject of political rhetoric, instead
of seeing deliberation as corrupt because the judges are interested-which
would disqualify them as arbiters, and therefore disqualify deliberation
as a game-Aristotle sees deliberation as superior and less corruptive just
because its judges are interested. What would be a bribe for a judge in
a judicial setting becomes an incentive in deliberative rhetoric. While he
thinks that good laws will exclude irrelevant emotional appeals from
judicial argument, Aristotle argues that deliberative reasoning needs no
such procedural rules: 6thos is the most persuasive of appeals, and it is
right that it be so. When contemporary theories of public reason seek to
bar discussions of the characters of the speakers, they reduce political
20
Law may be, as Aristotle says, thought without
to judicial reasoning.

17.

HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION TO THE HISTORY OF EARLY SOCIETY

44 (Cosimo 2005) (1861).
18.

The way of life is what Aristotle means by constitution. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS

180 (Ernest Baker ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1948). A modem written constitution limits the
scope of deliberative rhetoric by announcing what politics may not do, while Aristotle's
constitution limits the scope by orienting deliberation towards an end, such as freedom or
wealth, embodied in the constitution.
In a courtroom or in private relations, one might demand justice, the consequences
be damned. But ftatjustitia,pereat mundi is almost impossible to sell in political
deliberation-unless one is speaking to a group that shares a set of religious
convictions that makes the end of the world seem like a means to a transcendently
good end.
Bernard Yack, Rhetoric and Public Reasoning: An Aristotelian Understandingof Political
Deliberation,34 POL. THEORY 417, 422 (2006). I remember people, and I may have been
one of them, who thought that immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Vietnam was
the right policy, consequences be damned. So, while I think Yack's point remains sound,
it is less categorical than he makes it.
19. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 7, at 31.

20. Thus, according to Rawls, attacks on character or self-interest amount to "an
intellectual declaration of war" that makes it impossible to regard speakers as arguing in
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desire (nous aneu orexis),21 but political deliberation is desiring reason
or rational desire.
Political argument, unlike legal argument, has nothing to be
subordinate to. Consequently, we can't separate the good as the product
of political argument from the good as such, as we can separate legal
justice from justice as such. Consider, for example, these lines from
Justice Jackson's opinion in Williamson v. United States:22 "[Tihe very
essence of constitutional freedom of press and of speech is to allow more
liberty than the good citizen will take. The test of its vitality is whether
we will suffer and protect much that we think false, mischievous and
bad, both in taste and intent."23 Jackson shows that legal justice itself
erects a distinction between itself and justice more broadly considered.
There is no parallel distinction between political utility and utility in
general. Law may have an internal morality, but politics can't. It just
has morality, not a morality external to it, because political morality is
the only morality there is.'
Take again the example of a lawsuit that is quashed because the
government claims that for it to defend itself would force it to reveal
secrets that endanger national security. There is then no controversy,
and so no legal justice is possible. But that leaves the question of
justice-real justice, actual justice-untouched. Deliberation aims at
deciding on the most useful course of action. There is no form of
advantage that is cabined by deliberative rhetoric but which falls short
of true good. The procedural rules necessary for political argument do
not produce their own form of fairness or their own good. They are
purely instrumental means for doing one's best to get the best decision
in the circumstances. Contemporary formulations of public reason
conflate deliberative with judicial reasoning by making procedural rules
substantive. Good laws limit the subject of judicial reasoning by taking
as much as possible off the table; proposals to limit deliberative
reasoning to things on which all can reasonably agree try to do the same
for political rhetoric.25

good faith. John Rawls, The Domain of the Politicaland Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.
U. L. REV. 233 (1989).

21. AmsrTOTLE, supra note 18, at 146.
22. 184 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1950).
23. Id. at 283. Compare Aristotle's statement that the just man will take less than
what he's entitled to.
24. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
25. Yack, supra note 18, at 418.
Public reason in these models is a constrained reason, a form of deliberation that
sharply limits both the form and substance of political argument to facilitate
cooperation among free and equal individuals. Aristotelian public reasoning, in
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Judicial rhetoric, even if it fails to uncover the truth about what
happened, is still defensible as it protects the rights and dignity of the
parties and makes conflict manageable and finite. Political rhetoric can't
take those justifications as sufficient, and in that sense it is not a game.
Even if voting is a substitute for violent conflict and makes us treat
citizens as fellows and not enemies, we all have a stake in getting the
answers right. In judicial rhetoric only the parties have something at
stake, and the rest of us can be complacent as we watch justice be done,
even at the cost of being indifferent to whether it is true justice or not.
In both cases, there can be a tension between the ideals of equal
participation and of getting the best answer, but that tension is resolved
differently in the two cases, with equality taking priority in judicial
rhetoric and the best answer in political discourse. 6
The Rhetoric makes judicial rhetoric subordinate to political argument,
not to set it free within a limited sphere, but because the laws should
decide as much as possible, leaving to judges (and juries) only that
judgment of particulars about which the law cannot speak. Instead of
praising judicial rhetoric for its civilizing effects, Aristotle wants to limit
its operation as far as possible.27 Similarly, where Jack sees the

contrast, lacks such constraints. It draws its premises from the whole range of
"reputable opinions," rather than from the limited number of premises that could,
at least in principle, command reasonable assent of all members of the community.
Id. at 417-18 (footnote omitted); see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 7, at 32-37. ARISTOTLE,
TOPICS 5-6 (W.A. Pickard-Cambridge trans., Digibooks.com 2006).
26. Therefore Aristotle warns against the dangers of emotional appeals in judicial
rhetoric. The jury has no personal stake in the outcome and so can be moved by extraneous
appeals. In political argument, he thinks that self-interest makes judges less vulnerable
to emotional distraction.
27. Sammons, supra note 1, at 531.
In [Aristotle's Rhetoric] legal rhetoric is to be considered as subsumed by the
deliberative and is good only when and because it is in the service to those
judgments that arose from the deliberative (which, given his assumption of an
audience acting as good citizens, it should always be). He did not see the alterity
of legal rhetoric as a potential threat to the polity because he did not think of it
as separate from the political, but as fully subordinated to it.
Id. "If we see our game as seeking an external justice, it is a matter of Huizingan
'righteousness,' and as he rightly observes, being no longer a true game it will fail to
civilize us as true games can." Id. at 542.
Law reflects but in no sense determines the moral worth of a society. The values
of a reasonably just society will reflect themselves in a reasonably just law. The
better the society, the less law there will be. In Heaven there will be no law, and
the lion will lie down with the lamb. The values of an unjust society will reflect
themselves in an unjust law. The worse the society, the more law there will be.
In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously
observed.
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 110-11 (1977).
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relative autonomy of legal argument, and of drama, as providing a space
for criticism, Aristotle sees no such thing. Equity is not critical of justice;
it corrects it in a particular case.2
The judicial decision does not criticize politics and the laws partly
because Aristotle is such an unhistorical thinker. So let me make the
relation of political and judicial reasoning more historical. While
Tocqueville is constantly quoted with approval when he says that
"[t]here is hardly a political question in the United States which does not
sooner or later turn into a judicial one,"29 the reverse is also the case.
If the verdict in a trial does not correspond with democratic conceptions
of justice, the people can turn to legislation to overturn the verdict. Roe
v. Wade3" may be settled law, but it isn't settled justice. City of Boerne
v. Flores3 is no longer good law because Congress has overridden it in
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).32 Thus crimes
come into and go out of existence as law and political argument decide
what can be adjudicated. Spousal abuse, sexual harassment, insider
trading, and price fixing were not crimes in the past. Abortion was
criminalized and then decriminalized. Politics decides too what will not
be a judicial issue, giving immunity to gun manufacturers.33
Maine captures this phenomenon perfectly: 'That 'all men are equal'
is one of a large number of legal propositions which, in progress of time,
have become political." Therefore, in the passage I quoted earlier,
Jack says that "clients with strong and strongly conflicting intentional
goals-often understood by themselves as principled differences-represent
the ancient risk of a return to violence." 5 But violence is not the only
alternative. Politics is another. At this point, the ludic nature of legal
argument is overcome; justice according to law is not good enough.

28. "[F]or Aristotle the equitable judgment is still interpretation of the positive law
itself, not of some independent and superior norm that would have to be called moral, for
instance." Richard Bodfius, The NaturalFoundationsof Right andAristotelianPhilosophy,
in ACTION AND CONTEMPLATION: STUDIES IN THE MORAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT OF

ARISTOTLE 73 (Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins eds., 1999).
29. ALEX DE TOCQUEVILLE, Democracy in America, in DEMOCRACY IN AMERICAN AND
Two ESSAYS ON AMERICA 1, 315 (Gerald E. Bevan trans., Penguin Books 2003).
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

31. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012).
33. KAHN, supra note 9, at 34. "The quality of the exception is always one of selflimitation: the exception cannot become normal. Nevertheless, the nature of norms is such
that the exception is always subject to normalization: law will seek to extent to the
exceptional decision." Id. (footnotes omitted).
34. MAINE, supra note 17, at 54.
35. Sammons, supra note 1, at 544.
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The idea of the law as artificial reason, or justice as play, is a halftruth. Legal argument does not fit the model of games because legal
argument always occurs in a context of precedents.36 Each game of
chess, and each Ice Dancing competition, begins with an empty
scoreboard. This is true even if my son gives me a pawn or two before we
start playing. (Chess, not ice dancing.) In this regard, Jack, like
Aristotle, is not historical enough. For that reason, I would question the
image I used before that legal argument and the legal decision leave the
rest of the world untouched. Each decision partly structures the
problems and solutions that can be encountered later.
I want to look at two further features of political argument that
emerge through a contrast to the aspects of judicial rhetoric that Jack
highlights. The first is the nature of representation; the second will be
the nature of expertise or proficiency. I mentioned at the beginning that
if judicial argument is a game, it is a strange one because one set of
people plays and another pays, wins, and loses. In fact, one great
difference between political and legal argument today and in Aristotle's
time is that today both political and legal argument are carried on by
representatives. We live in a representative democracy, and retain
attorneys to carry on the game of legal combat in our names.3" Unlike
poetic representations, both political and legal representation is always
transparent. Watching Shakespeare's history plays, our judgment is

36. Id. at 542. "Arguments appealing to statute and precedent were, at rock bottom,
arguments about integrity, faithfulness, fairness, and so forth. They were, in other words,
also narrative claims about the character of the community offered in opposition to other
narrative claims about the character of the community." Id.
37.

J.E. GREEN, THE EYES OF THE PEOPLE: DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF SPECTATORSHIP

68 (2010).
The history of democratic practice prior to the birth of representative democracy
was so dominated by the institutionalization of the People as an actual legislative
assembly that it was difficult for philosophers of the new representative system
to imagine the People playing any other role, even if the very structure of
representative government ought to have inaugurated precisely such a rethinking.
Id.
I disagree with Green first because until democracy became representative democracy,
with the single exception of Athens, democracy was more a term of opprobrium than of
reference, and second because Hobbes did engage in such rethinking. The better point is
[i]f early theorists of representative government-especially French thinkers like
Siey~s, Constant, and Guizot-always treated representation as much as a check
upon popular power as a device for extending it, in the following generations of
the nineteenth century and beyond, when formal aristocracy had altogether
receded from social life and voting rights became gradually universalized,
representative government was widely interpreted as a fully democratic institution
that served, rather than restricted, the power of the People.
Id. at 70-71.
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about Shakespeare's characters, not the actual kings they represent.3 8
"[A] symbol is not a source of information about what it represents, does
not depict or make allegations."39 Legal argument is supposed to lead
to a judgment not of the lawyers but of the claimants and the merits of
their cases, and political argument too leads to a decision about what to
do, not about which speaker is preferred.
Representation then makes the situation of argument more complicated. Three sets of people are involved: the parties who go to court for
justice, the lawyers who represent them, and the judges to whom
representations are made. If justice is play, it is the sort of game that
has judges who decide who the winners are, not just referees who insure
fair play. Political argument, by contrast, maintains the fiction that the
first and third sets of people are identical: the people affected by a
decision are those who make the decision, even if a different group of
people make the arguments. There are no neutral judges.
Representation means something different in political and in legal
argument, and I suggest that the differences are best understood by
thinking about representation as a trope. 40 These figures of speech give
political and legal argument a degree of freedom from claims to a literal
truth, the freedom that Jack highlights; the fidelity to reality of
rhetorical argument remains but becomes more indirect. 41 The lawyer
represents her client by metaphor, which is why the game of legal
argument advertises its own artificiality.42 In the long passage I quoted

38. Pitkin argues that representation begins in judicial argument, and then since early
Parliaments were courts, was transferred to political argument.
The communal consent to taxation became linked with a Roman-law doctrine that
all parties having something at stake in a civil case had a right to participate in,
or at least to attend, its trial. With Parliament being considered a court, the idea
came easily that the communities had a right to participate in the levying of
taxes, since they had something at stake in the decision.
HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, The Concept ofRepresentation,in REPRESENTATION 1, 3 (Hannah
Fenichel Pitkin ed., 1969) (footnotes omitted).
39. Id. at 12.
40. "Basically, as the word's etymology suggests, 'representation' means 're-presentation,' a making present of something absent-but not making it literally present. It must
be made present indirectly, through an intermediary; it must be made present in some
sense, while nevertheless remaining literally absent." Id. at 16. "Thus, too, rhetoric dresses
itself up in the form of politics, as do those who pretend to a knowledge of it...."
ARISTOTLE, supra note 7, at 39.
41. For this indirect relation to reality, see my "Aristotle" in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
RHETORICAL STUDIES (Michael MacDonald ed., forthcoming 2015).
42. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 17-18 (Prometheus Books 1988) (1651) ("The
names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and displease us, because all men
be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the
common discourses of men, of inconstant signification .... And therefore such names can
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earlier, Jack talks about legal argument "translat[ing] this potential for
violence." Legal representation is metaphorical; someone represents a
principal by translating-the Latin for metaphor-the combat from one
arena to another." Advocates translate desires into rights, a language
that allows for adjudication rather than combat. At the same time, this
translation deletes the intensity of desire, which is not taken up into the
validity of the claim to a right or wrong. As I said before, the American
system of judicial rhetoric engages professional adversaries supposedly
in the interests of equality, so that the decision does not depend on the
skill of the parties, which is irrelevant to the rights and wrongs of the
case, but the inequalities of advocates can replace that of the clients.
Rhetoric has from the beginning been both an alternative to force and
its own form of coercion; here it both renders parties equal and
unequal.4 5
By contrast, the member of Congress, or the President for that matter,
represents the people by synecdoche, by a part standing for the whole,
a replica of the realm. Each speaker in deliberative rhetoric claims to

never be the true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of
speech: but these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy. . . ."). For the
relations of lawyers to their personae, see JOHN NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE
LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMEs, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS (1976).
43. Sammons, supra note 1, at 544.

44. In Aristotle's third genre of rhetoric, epideictic, representation becomes imitation.
Its master trope is not metaphor or synecdoche but metonymy: "I pledge allegiance to the
flag and to the republic for which it stands." I develop ideas of epideictic rhetoric in The
Way We Live Now: RhetoricalPersuasionand DemocraticConversation,63 MERCER L. REV.

807 (2012).
45. David Luban, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren't Busy
Assaulting It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 819.

Once we accept that human dignity requires litigants to be heard, the justification
of the advocate becomes clear. People may be poor public speakers. They may be

inarticulate, unlettered, mentally disorganized, or just plain stupid. They may
know nothing of the law, and so be unable to argue its interpretation.... None
of this should matter.... Just as a non-English speaker must be provided an
interpreter, the legally mute should have-in the very finest sense of the term-a
mouthpiece.

Thus, [the] argument connects the right to counsel with human dignity in two
steps: first, that human dignity requires litigants to be heard, and second, that
without a lawyer they cannot be heard.
Id.

Contrast James Bohman, Deliberative Democracy and Effective Social Freedom:

Capabilities, Resources, and Opportunities, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON
REASON AND POLITICS 331,332 (James Bohman &William Rehg eds., 1997) ("Deliberative
democracy should not reward those groups who simply are better situated to get what they
want by public and discursive means; its standard of political equality cannot endorse any

kind of cognitive elitism.").
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speak for the whole, to represent the community.46 Each, therefore,
accuses the other of representing a faction. In judicial rhetoric, it is
assumed that there is such a difference-of interest as well as perspective-and parties can argue not for a common good but for what they
themselves deserve. A deliberative appeal assumes-and in the best
argument the argument itself makes the assumption come true-that the
deliberative body and the community have a single interest that is to be
represented. Judicial rhetoric has to translate a client's desires and
hopes into the technical language of rights; no such translation is needed
for political rhetoric. Instead, we argue about whether some object of
desire is a common good. In judicial rhetoric, each speaker represents a
client. No one represents justice or the community. No one "speaks for
England," as Arthur Greenwood was urged to do in the House of
Commons in 1940.
Deliberative rhetoric consists in a clash of competing synecdoches,
competing arguments that purport to stand for the whole community
and the common good. Judicial rhetoric features a clash of competing
metaphors, and the judges choose which metaphor stands for a contested
reality. Synecdoche depends on each member of the assembly assuming
an identity between his own good and that of the whole. 47 Lawyers and
judges can be professionals, but not politicians. I've insisted on rhetoric
as a civic art, a craft necessarily practiced by citizens; here one can say

46. There are other ways of representing the whole than through argument. Writing
of Weber's charismatic leader, Green says:
[Tihe People does not choose the charismatic leader so much as acknowledge him
or her.... Thus Weber can write of the pure bearer of charisma that "he does not
derive his right from [the charismatic community's] will, in the manner of an
election. Rather, the reverse holds: it is the duty of those to whom he addresses
his mission to recognize him as their charismatically qualified leader."
GREEN, supra note 37, at 147 (quoting MAX WEBER, Sociology of CharismaticAuthority,
in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 245, 246-47 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills
eds., reprt. 1972) (second alteration in original)).
47. Since Aristotle's time, and really since the modern invention of the state with
Hobbes, factions have gone from a disease which a good constitution will purge, to what
Hume called parties of principle, modeled on theological disputes, to parties as institutionalized organs of the state, with various interest groups having their own government
department. Rousseau followed ancient Athenian practice by asserting that deliberation
required that citizens not talk to one another before voting, since persuasion causes
factions and occludes the general will. For Rousseau, the sovereign general will, like God,
cannot be represented; all representation is faction. This has been a history of changes in
the meaning of the synecdoche of representation. KAHN, supra note 9, at 15. "[Ihf the
sovereign is he who decides, a system in which no political actor can make an uncontested
claim to be sovereign is one that cannot localize the power to decide." Id. Under the rule
of law, "[tihe sovereign is displaced from view, lingering at best as a mere abstraction-popular sovereignty-but not capable of any concrete intervention." Id. at 32.
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that political representation is also civic in a way legal representation
need not be.4
Unlike the politician, because the legal representative must insist on
a difference between his persona and his person,49 the legal advocate
may do things that otherwise would be illegal and immoral. Legal
representatives have privileges of immunity from liability because of the
representative relation between agent and representative.5 0 Acts that
would otherwise be assaults are part of the game, if the game is ice
hockey. Making the weaker case appear stronger is a duty in judicial
rhetoric, but in deliberative situations it is a reason to put Socrates to
death.
The prohibition against vouching for one's client makes no sense in
political rhetoric.5" There is nothing parallel to contempt of court for
political rhetoric. In arguing about legislation, we can either talk about
the intent of the legislators-original intent-or the intent of the
voters-original meaning. This is a dispute about how to define the
people represented in politics. In political rhetoric, there is nothing
equivalent to a frivolous claim or argument. Rick Perry can run for
President by asserting that Al Queda and ISIS have infiltrated the
United States through the border with Mexico, and there is no judge to
sanction him. There is nothing equivalent for deliberative rhetoric to the
adage that "a man who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client." A
political representative cannot be sanctioned for providing ineffective
counsel. Because a member of Congress represents a whole community,
none of us can complain that what he does in our name is not what we

48.
49.

EUGENE GARVER, ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC: AN ART OF CHARACTER (1994).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2011) ("A lawyer's representation of a

client... does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or
moral views or activities.").
50.
[L]awyers are in most jurisdictions absolutely immune from tort liability for
defamatory statements that they make in court. Similarly, although a little more
broadly, lawyers are expressly protected against certain forms of legal liability
that might otherwise attach to persons who do what lawyers do for their clients:
A lawyer who encourages a client to breach a contract is not liable to the client's
promisee for tortious interference with contract; a lawyer who gives legal advice
to a corrupt business is not guilty of racketeering; and, more broadly still, a
lawyer who gives good faith legal advice cannot be held liable as an accessory to
tortious actions that her client takes on the basis of this advice.
DANIEL MARmOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVOCACY IN ADEMOCRATIC AGE 32 (2008)
(footnotes omitted).
51. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Profession's Rule Against Vouching For Clients:
Advocacy and "The Manner That Is the Man Himself," 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & Pus.
POL'Y 145 (1993).
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want and declare ourselves not bound by a law he has made. In fact, the
first great theorist of representation, Hobbes, wrote in response to just
this problem: how can masters authorize a sovereign and thereby become
masters no more? Because of the difference between metaphor and
synecdoche, a judicial representative can represent anything, a bridge,
one of Hobbes's examples, or an endangered species, or a corporation.5 2
On the other side, you have to be represented to be a party to a lawsuit,
but you don't have to be represented to be a citizen. Citizens need to be
represented to be heard. I am represented by someone in a legislature,
whether I voted for her or not, and indeed whether I voted or not. She
still does things in my name. Voting a representative out of office is not
like firing one's attorney. In court, a party always has the right to
represent herself, while no one has that right in a representative
democracy. The sovereign people never appear in an unrepresented form,
just as Hobbes argues that God is silent and speaks only through being
represented.53
[T]hough God Almighty can speak to a man, by Dreams, Visions, Voice,
and Inspiration; yet he obliges no man to believe he hath so done to
him that pretends it; who (being a man) may erre, and (which is more)
may lie."
When we give up on politics and ask experts to decide on the best way
to solve economic problems or problems of social welfare, those experts
do not represent us. We delegate the decision to them, and so they make

52.
There are few things, that are uncapable of being represented by Fiction.
Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may be personated by a
Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things Inanimate, cannot be Authors, nor
therefore give Authority to their Actors: Yet the Actors may have Authority to
procure their maintenance, given them by those that are Owners, or Governours,
of those things. And therefore, such things cannot be Personated, before there be

some state of Civill Government.
supra note 42, at 84-85. Corporations, therefore, can be persons because they can

HOBBES,

be "personated" for purposes of judicial argument, since they can be represented
metaphorically, but not in deliberative argument, since they are not parts of a whole
represented by a part through synecdoche.
53. JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNrrY OF LEGISLATION 159 (1999) ("Respect has to do
with how we treat each other's beliefs about justice in circumstances where none of them
is self-certifying, not how we treat the truth about justice itself (which, after all, never
appears in politics inpropriapersona,but only-if at all-in the form of someone's controversial belief)."); GREEN, supranote 37, at 79 ("[Al repeated metaphor in The FederalistPapers
is to liken the decisions of representative institutions to reason, and the unmediated forays
of the People into direct governance as passion.").
54. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 271 (A.R. Waller ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1904).
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a decision for us, substituting their judgment for ours. 5 If this is a
game, it is a game without judges, as the best argument is its own
criterion and therefore its own judge. We may be bound by the decision.
We can think of our relation to experts as contractual. We pay for their
expertise in the currency of obedience. But they do not represent us.
That is not an argument against expertise. It is simply an observation
that Aristotle makes by saying that when one hits on principle, one is
no longer engaged in rhetorical argument but in scientific reasoning.
I turn from representation to the other feature that makes me doubt
the analogy of legal reasoning to games, and to deny the analogy for
political reasoning. Citizens' participating in legal and political argument
through representatives invites the subjects of law and politics to become
specialized. The law, precisely because of its connection to justice, can
never be fully understood as a field for expertise. 8 Against Coke, we
can juxtapose Descartes. Here is Coke:
[Tihen the King said, that he thought the law was founded upon
reason, and that he and others had reason, as well as the Judges: to
which it was answered by me, that true it was, that God had endowed
His Majesty with excellent science, and great endowments of nature;
but His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England,
and causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes
of his subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason but by the
artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an act which
requires long study and experience, before that a man can attain to the
cognizance of it .... "
And here, in contrast, is the beginning of the Discourse on Method:
Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed;

for every one thinks himself so abundantly provided with it, that those
even who are the most difficult to satisfy in everything else, do not

55. Yack, supra note 18, at 428 ("Unlike the professionals that we often pay to advise
us, [public speakers] share with us an interest in the outcome of the issue at hand and
therefore seek to persuade us to do something, rather than merely lay out the options
before us.").
56. See Aristotle's remarks on music in Politics VIII, which I discuss in Aristotle's
Rhetoric: An Art of Character. GARVER, supra note 48, at 49.
57. 12 Coke's Rep. 65, available at http://faculty.history.wisc.edu/somnerviUe367/
367044.htm. But see LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 131
(Alexander Fraser ed., Dover Publications 1959) (1689)) ("[D]oth it not often happen, that
a man of an ordinary capacity very well understands a text, or a law, that he reads, till he
consults an expositor, or goes to councel; who by that time he hath done explaining them,
makes the words signify either nothing at all, or what he pleases.").
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usually desire a larger measure of this quality than they already
possess."

Rhetorical argument, judicial and deliberative, lies between these two
poles, between epistemic democracy and expertise. We have to reason
about things for which there are no experts, but the presumed equality
of all reasoners is not a rationale for sloth. Protagoras, in Plato's
eponymous dialogue, gives the canonical response, arguing that to be a
citizen everyone has to have an equal ability to discern and dispute
about justice, but that he will make the people who pay him more
successful in arguing about justice. Augustine, or whoever wrote the De
Rhetorica attributed to him, puts Protagoras' point more succinctly.
Rhetoric concerns things about which people would be ashamed not to
have an opinion. "[I]t would be disgraceful not to know, and which we,
even if we do not know, nevertheless talk about as if we do .... 59
Spinoza echoes the point in his social contract when-note the words I've
italicized[E]ach must have firmly resolved and contracted to direct everything
by the dictate of reason alone (which no one dares to oppose openly lest
he appear to lack understanding) to bridle his appetite when it
suggested anything harmful to another, to do to nobody what he would
not wish done to himself, and finally, to defend his neighbor's right as
if it were his own.'

Here we can see a crucial contrast between judicial and deliberative
rhetoric. In contrast to Coke's dictum, Blackstone says that while "a long
course of reading and study is required to form a professor of laws, 'but
every man of superior fortune thinks himself born a legislator."'' One

58. RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD 11 (John Yates trans., 2008).
59. Otto Alvin Loeb & William Charles Kurth, The De Rhetorica of AureliusAugustine,
35 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 90.97 (1968). Apparently, the latest scholarly consensus is in
favor of Augustine's authorship. See generally id. "Verum ut facilius intellegatur,quae sit
haee ipsa conditio, quam demonstratam esse volumus, omnia quaecumque huius modi sunt,
ut ea nescirepudorisit, et quae vel ignorantes,quasi sciamus tamen, cum simulatione prae
nobis ferimus, quotienscumque in dubitationem vocantur, efficiunt civilem quaestuionem."
Id. Compare Mill: "No one but a fool... feels offended by the acknowledgment that there
are others whose opinion, and even whose wish, is entitled to a greater amount of
consideration than his."
JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE
GovERNMENT 105-06 (Serenity Publishers 2008).
60. Benedict de Spinoza, A Treatise on Religion and Politics, in MORAL PHILOSOPHY
FROM MONTAIGNE To KANT 239,245-46 (J.B. Schneewind ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).
61. WALDRON, supra note 53, at 9C (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 9).
Similarly Locke in the Second Treatise: The law of nature is "intelligible and plain to a
rational Creature... as the positive Laws of Common-wealths; nay possibly plainer; as
much as Reason is easier to be understood, than the fansies and intricate contrivances of
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of the subjects of deliberative rhetoric is legislation, but the Rhetoric has
little to say about it, and after Aristotle says that little, he takes it all
back, saying that "all this is the business of political science, not of
rhetoric":
In legislation... it is useful to an investigator not only to know what
constitution is advantageous on the basis of past history but also to
know the constitutions in effect in other states, observing what
constitutions are suitable to what sort of people. Thus, it is clear that
in constitutional revision the reports of travelers are useful (for there
one can learn the laws of foreign nations) and [that] for debates about
going to war the research of those writing about history [is useful]. But
all these subjects belong to politics [politikb], not to rhetoric. 2
If deliberation is a game, then, it is more like Trivial Pursuit, in which
you have to know something to win, than it is like chess, where all you
need to know are the rules and possibilities within the game itself, as in
judicial rhetoric. Judicial rhetoric is doubly subordinate, first to
deliberative rhetoric, which is in turn subordinate to politics. Political
argument shades into politics because there is no difference between the
goods that politics seeks and those talked about in deliberative rhetoric,
as there is between legal justice and justice as the community understands it.
I want to close by returning to Maine's insight that 'That 'all men are
equal' is one of a large number of legal propositions which, in progress
of time, have become political."' Equality is now part of the American
constitutional ethos. Whatever its status before the Civil War, Lincoln
and the Fourteenth Amendment made the Declaration of Independence
part of the Constitution, the constitution in Aristotle's sense is the way
of life and purpose of the community. As a legal principle, it states that
all parties to a conflict are to be treated equally-justice is blind. This is
the equality of competing metaphors prior to a judgment that one of
them is a faithful representation of reality. As a political principle, it is
an equality of all the parts of the whole, an equality of synecdoche. The
principle is often today expressed in parody, in which each faction claims
to be a victim and therefore deserving of special treatment. "All men are
equal" is a passport that allows political issues to become legal and legal

Men, following contrary and hidden interests put into Words."

LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE
OF GOVERNMENT 12 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1980) (1690).
62. ARISTOTLE, supra note 7, at 55 (all but final alteration in original) (footnotes
omitted); but see ARISTOTLE, POETICS (Stephen Halliwell ed., trans. Harvard Univ. Press

1999) ("The earliest poets make people speak politically, present day poets make them
speak rhetorically.").
63. MAINE, supra note 17, at 54.
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issues to become political. Equality is the place where legal argument
gains and loses its autonomy.

